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Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002300100033-2

Deputies' Meeting

Monday, 14 July 1952

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PRESENT: General Smith, Messrs. Wisner, Becker, Hedden, Col. White, [REDACTED]

General Smith:

a. Stated he had discussed a certain situation in Guatemala with Undersecretary Bruce and this matter had been turned over to Doc Matthews in Bruce's absence. In response to a query from the Director, Mr. Wisner noted that Mr. Dulles had been handling this matter and, after a full discussion wherein the Director gave certain instructions concerning the above situation, he directed that Messrs. Dulles, Wisner and Hedden talk this matter over. However, in the final analysis, DD/P would be the responsible officer in CIA, provided we participated in the operation in question.

b. Referred to a personal cable from [REDACTED] (IN 18755) which stated that (1) a strong effort was being made by the Japanese Government through State Department channels to secure permission for the return of 7,000 Japanese former inhabitants to the Bonin-volcano Islands; (2) these Islands are now under the Military Government of CINCPACFLT and their strategic importance has been emphasized by the JCS; (3) important facilities exist on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Director went on to say that [REDACTED] had requested CNO to make representations to State on this question and had also asked our concurrence in voicing strong opposition to the Japanese request. After some discussion, the DCI directed that (1) dissemination of the information contained in this cable be held to an absolute minimum; (2) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] not know the attitude of CNO on this matter. (NOTE: At the DCI's direction, [REDACTED] undertook to reply to [REDACTED] cable indicating that we would give support to his request and the matter would be handled in a discreet fashion.)

Mr. Wisner:

a. Asked the Director if he had had opportunity to raise the Saipan matter with the President and the Secretary of the Interior. The Director indicated that he had not.

b. Referred to the [REDACTED] cable which indicated that lesser lights of the [REDACTED] Government were beginning to be approached in an attitude of friendliness by the Soviets. After some discussion, the DCI directed that this matter be placed on the agenda for the next IAC Meeting. Mr. Becker undertook to do this.

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
Mr. Wisner (Cont'd.)

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c. Reported that we had been receiving information [] which indicated the possibility that the North Koreans were making preparations for another "push to the South" and noted that the Department of State had been following this information rather closely. Mr. Becker noted in this connection that he had asked [] to dispatch a cable to Ambassador Kennan requesting him to determine, if possible, whether a certain Russian expert on Chinese affairs had, in fact, been sent to North Korea.

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f. Left with the Director a proposed statement to be signed by him for subsequent use in the [] magazine []

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g. Raised the question of the Merger Paper. After some discussion, the DCI directed Col. White to make certain changes in the chart appended thereto and stated he did wish to discuss this paper with a limited number of senior officers.

Col. White:

a. Noted he was seeing Mr. Broadbent of the Bureau of the Budget this week concerning our proposed move. The DCI directed that Col. White keep after this.

Mr. Becker:

a. Noted that anything could happen in Argentina and that PSB was being kept informed of events there.

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
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Mr. Becker (Cont'd.)

b. Noted that he felt that our reaction to the German kidnapping by establishing "blockades" in Berlin could well lead to trouble there. Mr. Wisner stated that the Berlin Committee had taken a similar view at its meeting on Friday. The Director stated that these kidnappings could be prevented if we received more accurate and timely counterintelligence information and, based on this, squads were formed ~~to~~ actually ~~to~~ go out and bring in the kidnappers.



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